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ABSTRACT With the purpose of identifying cyber threats and possible incidents, intrusion detection
systems (IDSs) are widely deployed in various computer networks. In order to enhance the detection
capability of a single IDS, collaborative intrusion detection networks (or collaborative IDSs) have been
developed, which allow IDS nodes to exchange data with each other. However, data and trust management
still remain two challenges for current detection architectures, which may degrade the effectiveness of such
detection systems. In recent years, blockchain technology has shown its adaptability in many fields, such
as supply chain management, international payment, interbanking, and so on. As blockchain can protect the
integrity of data storage and ensure process transparency, it has a potential to be applied to intrusion detection
domain. Motivated by this, this paper provides a review regarding the intersection of IDSs and blockchains.
In particular, we introduce the background of intrusion detection and blockchain, discuss the applicability
of blockchain to intrusion detection, and identify open challenges in this direction.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain technology, intrusion detection, collaborative network, trust management, data
sharing and management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, cyber-attacks have become evenmore complicated
and advanced. To help detect intrusions in a timely manner,
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are being widely imple-
mented in different types of networks (e.g., education and
financial organizations). Based on the deployed location [6],
an IDS can be categorized into host-based IDS (HIDS) and
network-based IDS (NIDS). The former mainly monitors the
characteristics of a local system and the system events in a
host for malicious activities. The latter by contrast monitors
network traffic and analyzes network protocols and traffic
payloads for suspicious events.
Moreover, an IDS can be generally classified into two
types based on the detection approaches: signature-based
IDS and anomaly-based IDS. The signature-based detection
(e.g., [15]) identifies an attack by comparing its stored signa-
tures against observed system or network events for potential
incidents. A signature (or rule) is a kind of pattern describ-
ing a known attack or exploit. The anomaly-based detection
(e.g., [7]) finds a suspicious activity by identifying signifi-
cant deviations between its pre-built normal profile and the
observed events. A normal profile is often created by mon-
itoring the characteristics of typical activity over a period
of time, which can represent the normal behavior related to
users, network connections and applications [17]. An alarm
could be generated if an abnormal scenario is identified.
Such detection systems have proven their capability of
protecting the networks they are deployed in against cyber-
threats. However, with the increasing number and complexity
of intrusions, a single or isolated IDS turns to be ineffective in
many scenarios, i.e., can be bypassed by advanced attacks [4].
Without timely detection of cyber-attacks, the whole net-
work is vulnerable to various damages, even the paralysis
of the entire network. To enhance the detection capability of
an IDS, collaborative intrusion detection systems/networks
(CIDSs/CIDNs) have been designed, allowing IDS nodes
to collect and exchange required information with each
other [21]. For example, by collecting traffic characteristics
from different detection sensors, a central server is more
sensitive to network anomalies than a single IDS.
Collaborative intrusion detection frameworks are widely
adopted and deployed in various organizations due to the
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enhanced detection performance, but two major issues still
remain: data sharing and trust computation. Firstly, data shar-
ing is a big challenge for collaborative detection, as not all
parties want to share their information explicitly. For exam-
ple, anomaly detection often employs machine learning tech-
niques to build normal profiles, in which a classifier requires
a large number of training items. Due to privacy concerns,
some organizations are not willing to share their data, making
the detection performance hard to optimize. Secondly, insider
attacks are one big challenge for collaborative detection,
which can greatly degrade the network security [4]. Thus,
how to effectively evaluate the trustworthiness of an IDS node
is a challenge in a distributed and collaborative environment.
For instance, with many collaborating parties, it is not an easy
task to effectively measure their reputation levels.
In the literature, a central server is often used as a trusted
point to help manage data sharing and trust computation for
IDSs among collaborating parties, even though this server can
become the weakest point for network security. To address
the above challenges, new technologies are needed in the area
of intrusion detection. In recent years, blockchain technology
receivedmuch attention from both academia and industry due
to its innovation, which allows mutually mistrusting parties
to exchange financial data without the need of a trusted third
party. This is the exactly desirable property for collaborative
detection, which opens a chance to solve the problems regard-
ing data sharing and trust management.
Contributions: A blockchain can be treated as a contin-
uously growing list of records, called blocks. Each block
is linked to the previous block using a cryptographic hash.
Blockchains are usually managed by a peer-to-peer network,
offering a transparent and integrity protected data storage
(i.e., be inherently resistant to modification of the data). More
specifically, the recorded data in any given block cannot be
altered retroactively without the alteration of all subsequent
blocks. In such case, an attacker has to control the majority
of network nodes for a successful modification, which is
not realistic in terms of current network size. Blockchain
technology has been initially applied to several domains like
international payment [2], healthcare [10], energy [16], etc.
Motivated by the adaptability of blockchains, this work aims
to discuss the possibility of combining blockchain technology
with intrusion detection. The contributions of this work can
be summarized as follows.
• We introduce the background of (collaborative) intru-
sion detection, and detail the challenges in a collabo-
rative detection system. It is highlighted that although
IDSs have been developed for nearly 40 years, data shar-
ing and trust management are still two major challenges.
• Based on the understanding of collaborative intru-
sion detection, we also introduce the background of
blockchain technology and its main applications. The
first blockchain was implemented in 2009 as a core
component of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency.
• We then provide insights on how and where the
blockchain technology can be applied for addressing
data sharing and trust management in the area of
intrusion detection. We also discuss some open chal-
lenges and identify future directions regarding this
intersection.
The remaining parts of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces the background of intrusion detec-
tion, collaborative IDSs, and the two challenges regarding
data and trust management. Section III introduces the back-
ground of blockchain technology and its application for
Bitcoin. In Section IV, we discuss how the blockchain tech-
nology can be applied for solving the challenges in intru-
sion detection. We then discuss some open issues and point
out future directions in Section V, and conclude our work
in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND ON INTRUSION DETECTION
This section introduces the background of a single IDS, col-
laborative IDSs and two major challenges: data sharing and
trust management.
A. INTRUSION DETECTION
Intrusion detection describes the process of monitoring net-
work or system events for any sign of possible incidents [17].
An IDS is an application to realize the process of intrusion
detection. Basically, an IDS can provide two main functions.
• Information Recording: An IDS can monitor the target
objects and record information locally. Then, the col-
lected data can be sent to other facilities for analysis,
like a central event management system.
• Alert Generation: The main task of an IDS is to gen-
erate alerts (alarms) to inform security administrators
of important identified anomalies. False alarm rates are
an important measurement to decide whether an IDS is
effective or not.
FIGURE 1. The deployment of HIDS and NIDS in a network environment.
As mentioned, an IDS can be generally classified into
HIDS and NIDS, whereas such classification can be more
specific according to the deployed locations like wireless-
based IDS, which identifies malicious activities through
monitoring wireless network packets and protocols. In prac-
tice, an IDS product often combines these two types of detec-
tion, as they can complement each other and provide a more
thorough protection. Fig. 1 depicts the deployment of both
HIDS and NIDS in a network environment.
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FIGURE 2. The typical architecture of a collaborative intrusion detection network.
Based on the detection approaches, an IDS can be either a
signature-based or an anomaly-based system. The signature-
based detection method, also called misuse-based detection,
is usually effective in detecting known exploits but would
be ineffective for unseen threats and the variants of known
threats. For instance, given a signature that searches a file-
name of ‘malware.exe’, an attacker can write a malicious
application named as ‘malware1.exe’ to easily bypass it.
By contrast, the anomaly-based detection has the capability
of detecting unknown threats (or zero-day threats). Such
detection firstly establishes a normal profile by monitoring
the system or network events for a period of time, and then
identifies any behavior that would be significantly different
from the established profiles. In literature, various machine
learning classifiers have been researched in building a normal
profile. In particular, profiles can be either static or dynamic
in practical usage [17]. A static profile would not be updated
while a dynamic profile would be updated periodically based
on the security policies. High false rates are a big limitation
for the anomaly-based detection.
In addition to the above two basic detection approaches,
there exists another detection method, called specification-
based detection, which identifies deviations between pre-
determined benign profile and observed events. The benign
profile is different from the normal profile in that the former
defines generally accepted events in advance. For example,
a benign profile can specify how particular protocols should
and should not be used [17].
B. COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION
Collaborative intrusion detection including CIDNs and
CIDSs were developed in practice, with the purpose of
enhancing the performance of a single IDS, which may be
easily bypassed by advanced or complicated attacks like
denial-of-service (DoS) attack. The root cause is that an IDS
usually has no information about its protected environments.
While the collaborative intrusion detection framework allows
various IDS nodes understanding the context by exchanging
data and information with each other. Traditional collabora-
tive systems can be classified into the following types.
• Hierarchical collaboration systems like EMERALD [14]
and DIDS [18];
• Subscribe collaboration systems like COSSACK [12]
and DOMINO [22];
• Peer-to-peer (P2P) query-based collaboration systems
like Netbait [3] and PIER [8].
In particular, EMERALD (Event Monitoring Enabling
Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances) was proposed
by Porras et al. [14], which aimed to detect malicious events
across a set of abstract layers in a large network. Simi-
larly, DIDS (Distributed Intrusion Detection System) was
designed by Snapp et al. [18], which identified anoma-
lies by combining distributed monitoring, data reduction
and centralized data analysis. COSSACK was developed by
Papadopoulos et al. [12], which required no human interven-
tion to mitigate DDoS attack intelligently. DOMINO (Dis-
tributed Overlay for Monitoring InterNet Outbreaks) was
proposed by Yegneswaran et al. [22], which could improve
detection performance by guiding collaboration among het-
erogeneous nodes. PIER [8], as an Internet-scale query
engine, could supports massively distributed and continuous
queries, and could serve as a building block for a set of
information centric applications.
Fig. 2 shows the typical architecture of a collaborative
intrusion detection network. It is seen that a node, say
node A, can exchange required information with each other
(e.g., node B, C, and D). A node is usually composed of
several components: IDS module, collaboration component,
and P2P communication component. More specifically, IDS
module can perform the intrusion detection functions includ-
ing monitoring network traffic and recording events. The
collaboration component is responsible for assisting a node
to exchange required data with other nodes and conduct cer-
tain operations like trust computation. P2P communication
component aims to help establish physical connection with
other IDS nodes.
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III. BACKGROUND ON BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
The basic functionality provided by a blockchain is a cryp-
tographically secure mechanism for obtaining a publically
verifiable and immutable sequence of records (referred to
as blocks) chronogically ordered by discrete time stamps.
Blockchains are typically shared and synchronized across a
peer-to-peer network, and as such are typically used as a
public, distributed ledger of transaction records [31]. Every
participant in the blockchain network can see the record data
and reject or verify it based on a consensus protocol. Once
accepted, records are appended to the blockchain in chrono-
logical order of their verification.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS
Blockchains are built upon a basic cryptographic primitive:
cryptographically secure hash functions [24], [25]. Such hash
functions H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n map an arbitrary-length
input to a fixed-length n-bit output and must satisfy the
following security requirements:
1) Preimage resistance: Given a hash value h, it should
require O(2n) effort to compute an x such that
H (x) = h.
2) Second preimage resistance: Given an input x and its
hash value h = H (x), it should require O(2n) effort to
compute an x ′ 6= x such that H (x ′) = h.
3) Collision resistance: It should requireO(2n/2) effort to
compute any two x 6= x ′ such that H (x) = H (x ′).
Note that for collisions, the adversary does not have any
control over the actual hash value.
In the context of blockchains, (second) preimage resistance is
of particular importance, as the ability to find second preim-
ages with a certain midfix would enable attackers to alter
existing blocks while keeping the chain intact. According to
the above security requirements, such an attack should have
a complexity of at least 2n for an n-bit hash function. For
contemporary hash functions, we typically have n = 256
or n = 512. The exact impact of any violation of these and
related security properties for Bitcoin’s blockchain has been
analyzed in detail in [26].
B. FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES
While the general principle of providing a secure discrete
timestamping mechanism by chaining records by means of
a cryptographically secure hash function was originally pro-
posed by Haber and Stornetta in the early 1990s [27], [28],
it has only found more widespread adoption since the pro-
posal of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [29].
The exact contents of the blocks varies between differ-
ent blockchain implementations. Besides the payload (con-
taining application-specific records or transactions) a block
commonly includes a timestamp and a cryptographic hash
value of the entire previous block in the chain. This chaining
principle is illustrated in Fig. 3.
We note that the timestamp usually provides an abstract
discrete notion of time in the sense that it is monotonously
increasing as the chain is extended, and does not have to
FIGURE 3. Schematic view of a blockchain.
be related to the time intervals between chain extensions,
see [29], [30].
The inclusion of the hash value of block n − 1 in block n
makes it computationally infeasible to modify the contents of
previous blocks, since it would require either finding chosen-
midfix (second) preimages of the hash function or a suitable
modification of all subsequent blocks. In other words, the fur-
ther a blockchain has already been extended beyond block
number n, the more confidence users of the blockchain can
have into the integrity and immutability of this block. This
chaining of hash values alsomakes the blockchain an append-
only log of records.
To reduce the storage requirements of a blockchain, indi-
vidual transactions can be hashed by means of a Merkle
tree [35], [36], see Fig. 4. The root of such a tree then serves
as a compact representation of all involved payloads.
FIGURE 4. Compact representation of four transaction payload as a
Merkle tree of four hashes.
C. TYPES OF BLOCKCHAINS
Entities can interact with a blockchain either as readers or as
writers [31]. A reader is participating passively in the trans-
action process by reading or analysing record contents or ver-
ifying the blockchain. In contrast, writers have the ability to
extend the blockchain, which typically involves participation
in the consensus protocol (see Sect. III-D). Blockchains are
then typically classified in two main categories:
Permissionless blockchains. In a permissionless or pub-
lic blockchain, any entity can be free to participate as a
reader or writer, and in particular also in the concen-
sus process. Examples of permissionless blockchains
include most cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [29] and
Zerocash [32], but also more general blockchains such
as Ethereum [30].
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Permissioned blockchains. For such kind of block-
chains, a central entity controls the set of entities
that can act as readers or writers. Consensus deci-
sions are either taken unilaterally by this central
entity, or by a pre-selected group (so-called ‘‘consor-
tium blockchains’’). Permissioned blockchains can be
further categorized into public and private permissioned
blockchains. They both restrict participation as writers
and in the consensus process. However, public per-
missioned blockchains allow anyone to read the state,
while private permissioned blockchains also restrict read
access. Examples of permissioned blockchains include
most blockchains developed for business, in particular
Hyperledger [33].
In the blockchain network, entities are typically identi-
fied by ownership of a public/private key pair which allows
them to sign transactions or any other interaction with the
network. For permissioned blockchains, these keys are typ-
ically generated and certified by the central entity, which
then essentially acts as a certificate authority in a public-key
infrastructure (PKI).
D. CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS
Blockchains are intended for environments without univer-
sal trust between all participants. As pointed out in [31],
the availability of a reliable and universally trusted third
party eliminates the need to use a blockchain. Even private
permissioned blockchain networks are therefore designed
to incorporate a consensus process to validate transactions.
We note however that even for such blockchains, a central
and trusted certificate authority for the associated PKI cannot
be avoided, especially given the importance of certificate
revocation issues.
This lack of universal trust implies a need for a distributed
consensus mechanism for block validation in blockchain net-
works. Such protocols can broadly be classified based on the
key property used for achieving distributed consensus:
Proof of work. In a proof of work scheme, a node in
the network succeeds in having a block accepted if it
can demonstrate having spent a predetermined amount
of computational resources on it (hence ‘‘work’’). This
enforced need to spend considerable resources prevents
Sybil attacks [34] (the creation of large numbers of
forged identities acting on behalf of one entity) unless
a single entity controls more than half of the total com-
putational resources in the network. A proof-of-work-
based protocol based on the cryptographic hash function
SHA-256 is deployed in the Bitcoin network [29].
Proof of stake. Consensus based on proof of stake is
reached by a a combination of random selection and
the wealth or influence (‘‘stake’’) of the participating
entities. It is based on the assumption that entities having
a large stake in the blockchain have a vital interest
in guaranteeing its integrity. It is used particularly in
the context of cryptocurrencies such as BlackCoin or
Peercoin.
Proof of elapsed time. In this variant, consensus is
achieved by having every potential validator node
request a secure randomwaiting time from a trusted exe-
cution environment which is embedded into the comput-
ing platform (such as Intel’s SGX). Every node waits for
the assigned time, and the first to finish claims validation
leadership. Since each trusted computing environment in
any node has a chance of being chosen, the probability
for any entity of being in control of the validation leader
is proportional to the amount of resources contributed to
the overall network.
E. APPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAINS
Cryptocurrency economy is by now the most popular appli-
cation of blockchain technology and also the most con-
troversial one since it enables a multibillion-dollar global
trading market of essentially anonymous transactions with-
out government control. At the time of writing, one Bitcoin
price is around $10000, and Litecoin, the number one alt-
coin in terms of popularity and user base, has also hit
an all-time high price of $100. When taking the fact that
there is no trusted party into consideration, these valuations
are even more remarkable. Compared to previous digital
cash constructions, the blockchain based ones ingeniously
combine the distributed consensus protocol, point-to-point
communication and PoW (Bitcoin) techniques to prevent
double-spend attacks and remove the need for a trusted
party.
Smart contracts are contracts which are automatically
enforced by computer protocols featuring the same kind of
agreement to act or not act without the need for trust between
parties. Smart contracts were first proposed by Szabo [37]
in 1996 and with blockchain, which can be regarded as a
distributed state machine without trusted third parties, can
now be brought into reality. Although the functionality is
limited due to a small instruction set that is not Turing-
complete, Bitcoin do support a small set of smart contracts.
Later on, the most notable open source project Ethereum [30]
aims at providing a Turing-complete programming language
to support arbitrary code execution on its blockchain, which
in turn supports any kind of smart contracts.
Besides the above applications, researchers are also look-
ing into the potential usage of blockchain in the realm of cryp-
tography research. Goyal and Goyal [38] investigated how
to use blockchains to overcome cryptographic impossibility
results, where blockchain is used as an alternative to trusted
setup, such as a common reference string, assumptions
in cryptography to realize non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) systems. Also, one-time programs as introduced by
Goldwasser et al. [39] can be constructed based on POS based
blockchain systems without relying on trusted hardware.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION
In this section, we describe the challenges in collaborative
intrusion detection and discuss the applicability of blockchain
technology.
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A. CHALLENGES IN COLLABORATIVE
INTRUSION DETECTION
Although intrusion detection has been studied for nearly
40 years, data sharing and trust computation in a collaborative
environment are still two major challenges.
• Data Sharing:Data sharing is a major issue for a collab-
orative detection system, as it is not a trivial task to let all
participating parties trust each other. For example, PKI
technology can help build some kind of trust, but it does
not always work for intrusion detection. Moreover, due
to privacy concerns, some parties are not willing to share
the data. Without enough data, it is unable to optimize
detection algorithms and to build a robust model for
identifying suspicious events.
• Trust Management: It is known that CIDNs/CIDSs are
vulnerable to insider attacks, where the intruders have
authorized access to the network. Typically, computa-
tional trust is often used to quantify the trust levels
among various nodes. In practice, a central server is
deployed to collect nodes’ traffic and behavioral data
and to compute the trust value of each node. However,
the trust management would become an issue when the
organization becomes large, as it is hard to find a trusted
third party, i.e., central server can be compromised.
B. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS
By design, blockchain technology is a decentralized and dis-
tributed ledger that enables recording transactions across a
set of nodes. It can be implemented in a peer-to-peer network
without the need of a trusted third party. The blockchain
integrity can be enforced by strong cryptography, making
it nearly impossible to compromise by any individual. Due
to the nature of blockchains, there is a chance of applying
such emerging technology for solving the above challenges
in intrusion detection.
Data Sharing: The data sharing problem is mainly caused
by two requirements: mutual trust and data privacy. Mutual
trust means that when sharing the data, collaborating parties
have to trust others who would not disclose the data. For
instance, two IT organizations would like to make an agree-
ment that theywill not share the data with others. Data privacy
indicates that the shared data may contain some information
linked to an actual organization, i.e., the shared traffic includ-
ing IP addresses and packet payloads that can be utilized to
refer the privacy of an organization.
Blockchains are one of the solutions that can be used to
mitigate this challenge. More specifically, data sharing can
be considered as a series of transactions. Firstly, collabo-
rating parties should make a data-sharing agreement, which
digitally signed by each party. Then, the agreement can be
kept in a blockchian box, which is public and unalterable.
In this case, other parties can access the blockchain box, read
the agreement, and confirm the ownership of the data. Such
permanent visibility of the agreement ensures that one party
cannot unilaterally repudiate it. Similar to the application
of blockchains in the healthcare domain [19], building an
open accounting system is able to offer trust among various
collaborating parties.
For data privacy, one solution is to share transformed data
instead of raw data. For example, suppose that a collaborating
party (say Party A) wants to verify the performance of their
designed classifier using the data from another party (say
Party B). As part of the data-sharing agreement, Party A
can deposit the classifier into the blockchain box, and then
Party B can retrieve the classifier, run it locally with the data
and send back the result to Party A. In this case, Party B
actually maintains the privacy of the raw data.
On the whole, for data sharing issue, blockchains can help
build mutual trust among collaborating parties and preserve
data privacy by working as a permanent public ledger of
contracts between data owners and other parties.
Trust Computation: Generally, a collaborative network
architecture can be classified as centralized, hierarchical and
distributed. In literature, distributed architecture has been
widely studied, while the other two are believed to suffer
from scalability and an issue of single point of failure. For a
CIDN, alert exchange is extremely important among various
IDS nodes, which can be used to help decide whether there is
an anomaly.
In addition, alert exchange can be used to compute the
trustworthiness of a node within the network. For example,
Fung et al. [5] designed a type of challenge-based CIDNs,
in which the trustworthiness of a node could be computed
based on the satisfaction of received alert-related informa-
tion. Their proposed architecture can be robust against some
insider attacks like newcomer attack and Betrayal attack,
but is still vulnerable to advanced collusion attack where a
group of malicious peers cooperate together by providing
false alarm rankings in order to compromise the network,
e.g., passive message fingerprint attacks [9]. Therefore, how
to perform trust computation in a robust way remains a
challenge.
Blockchain technology provides a potential way to miti-
gate this issue. For instance, Alexopoulos et al. [1] introduced
a blockchain-based CIDS, which applied blockchains for
enhancing trust among IDS nodes. In particular, they consid-
ered the raw alerts generated by each IDS node as transac-
tions in a blockchain, which could be replicated among the
collaborating nodes of a CIDN. Then, all collaborating nodes
adopted a consensus protocol to guarantee the validity of the
transactions before putting them in a block. This operation
can guarantee that alerts stored in the blockchain are tamper
resistant.
C. SCOPE OF APPLICATION FOR BLOCKCHAINS
When considering to use a blockchain in a particular applica-
tion scenario, it is important to keep in mind that it might
not be the most technically suitable solution. Even if an
application can benefit from a blockchain, its exact type
(cf. Sect. III-C) has to be appropriate.
Wüst and Gervais [31] outline a very general decision
process that allows to determine whether— and if yes, which
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FIGURE 5. Schematic decision diagram according to [31] to determine whether a blockchain (and if yes, which type of blockchain) to
use in which application scenario. TTP refers to a universally trusted third party.
type of – a blockchain makes sense for a certain application
scenario. This decision process is based upon the presence
(or non-presence) of a number of elementary properties, and
is outlined in Fig. 5.
As a first criterion, if an application does not need to
store state (or data records of any kind), it clearly does not
have any use for a blockchain. Also, if only one entity ever
writes or changes state, there is no need for record vali-
dation through consensus mechanisms, and any traditional
database will offer superior performance compared to the use
of blockchains. On the other hand, the existence of multiple
writers motivates the need for moderation of state updates.
This moderation can either be achieved by a universally
trusted third party (TTP), which should ideally be always
online and available for a network of many entities with
multiple writers to work seamlessly. If the introduction of
such a TTP is not feasible for the application scenario under
consideration, a blockchain might still not be required in
case all writers are identified in advance and are trusted.
If all writers are known but not necessarily trusted, a permis-
sioned blockchain can be used. Whether a private or public
permissioned blockchain should be chosen then depends on
the question whether public verifiability of the records is
required. If this is the case, anyone should be admitted as
readers, implying a public permissioned blockchain. Oth-
erwise, a private permissioned blockchain is appropriate.
In this context, it is important to note that even in a pub-
lic permissioned or permissionless blockchain, the option
to use encryption or hashing to protect record contents
always exists.
Finally, in case the set of writers is not known in
advance or can fluctuate greatly, a permissionless blockchain
can offer a suitable solution. This is for instance the case for
cryptocurrencies.
We stress that in all cases where this generic deci-
sion diagram suggests the use of a particular type of
blockchain, this should be taken as an initial guidance only,
as other application-specific considerations must be taken
into account as well.
V. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE TRENDS
In this section, we discuss some challenges regarding the
intersection of blockchain technology and intrusion detec-
tion, and identify future directions.
A. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS
Basically, blockchains and intrusion detection can comple-
ment each other. On the one hand, as metnioned above,
blockchain technology can be used to improve the perfor-
mance of an IDS, especially a CIDS in the aspects of data
sharing and trust computation. On the other hand, intru-
sion detection can help detect anomalies during blockchain
transactions. Pham and Lee [13] conducted a study to apply
anomaly detection as a proxy for suspicious user or event
detection, which is similar to the fraud detection in credit
card systems. However, each of them has some challenges
and limitations remain unsolved at current stages.
Intrusion detection has been studied for a long time, but
there are still many issues remained unsolved in real-world
applications, which may significantly degrade the detection
performance [11].
• Overhead Traffic With Limited Handling Capability:
In a heavy network traffic environment, overhead pack-
ets can greatly degrade the performance of a detection
system. If the traffic exceeds the maximum processing
capability of an IDS, a large amount of network packets
have to be discarded. For example, the computational
burden is at least linear in the size of the packet payload.
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• Limited Signature Coverage: The detection capability
of signature-based detection depends heavily on the
available signatures. In other words, the detection per-
formance is limited to the number and quality of the
deployed signatures. However, signatures are usually
limited and unable to cover all known attacks and
exploits.
• Inaccurate Profile Establishment: For anomaly-based
detection, it is difficult to build an accurate normal pro-
file due to the dynamic nature of traffic. More specif-
ically, an anomaly-based IDS often leverages machine
learning techniques to build a profile. However, training
data, especially labelled attack data, is very limited in
practice, resulting in an inaccurate machine learning
classifier.
• Massive False Alerts: It is very important for an IDS to
generate accurate alerts to notify security administrators
about network anomalies. However, false alarms are
a big challenge during detection because of immature
signatures and inaccurate profiles, which may signifi-
cantly degrade the detection performance and increase
the workload of security analysts. For instance, a large
company may generate more than 10,000 false alarms
each day.
FIGURE 6. Blockchain technology: challenges and limitations.
Blockchain technology is an emerging solution, which
still suffers from some inherent challenges and limitations,
as summarized in Fig. 6.
• Energy and Cost: The computational power is a concern
for blockchain usage [23]. Taking Bitcoin mining as
an example, it requires a high energy level to calculate
and verify transactions. Wang and Liu [20] found that
the computational power was added on single miners at
first, but could be greatly increased when the network
evolved.
• Security and Privacy:Many existing blockchain-related
applications require smart transactions and contracts to
be linked to known identities, which raise the privacy
and security concerns of the data stored on the shared
ledger. Moreover, blockchain technology itself could be
an attractive target for cyber-criminals, and thus suffer
from various attacks like distributed denial-of-service
attacks (DDoS).
• Latency and Complexity: Due to the distributed nature,
blockchain-based transactions may spend several hours
to finish until all parties update their correspond-
ing ledgers. This latency would create much uncer-
tainty for transaction participants and open a hole for
cyber-criminals.
• Awareness and Adoption: One of the major challenges
regarding blockchain technology is the lack of aware-
ness and adoption. For example, many people are short
of understanding of how it works. The future devel-
opment of blockchain depends upon how many parties
adopting the technology, but now it is still a question.
• Organization and Size: It is very likely that many differ-
ent organizations would develop their own blockchains
and standards. With the increased size of distributed
ledgers, this may greatly degrade the performance
and make the blockchains less efficient than current
frameworks.
• Regulations and Management: Regulations are often
far behind the advanced technology. Due to the lack
of common standards for completing transactions on a
blockchain, Bitcoin blockchain has bypassed existing
regulations for better efficiency. However, blockchain
applications are expected to work within regulations.
B. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As an emerging technology, blockchains definitely will keep
evolving, because of its disruptive capability across vari-
ous industries and domains. The technology is expected to
validate itself with more proof-of-concept implementations.
In the field of intrusion detection, blockchain technology can
make positive impacts, but its major applications are more
focused on the following aspects, in terms of a trade-off
between benefit and cost.
• Data Sharing: By design nature, blockchains are suit-
able for handling the recording of events, medical
records, and transaction processing. As data manage-
ment is a big issue for a large distributed detection
system or network, blockchains have a great potential
to improve the performance through enforcing trust and
data privacy among collaborating parties.
• Alert Exchange: Alexopoulos et al. [1] already intro-
duced how to use blockchains to secure the alerts gen-
erated by various nodes and ensure only truthful alerts
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would be exchanged. Due to the lack of real system
applications, it is an interesting and important direction
for future research studies.
• Trust Computation: As mentioned above, some col-
laborative detection approaches (e.g., challenge-based
CIDN [5]) utilize alerts to evaluate the trustiness of oth-
ers, blockchains can thus provide a solution to enhance
the process of trust computation. For instance, design-
ing blockchain-based approaches to verify whether the
received alert-information is unaltered or not.
As blockchains were originally designed for cryptocurren-
cies, we have to avoid the situation that ‘‘blockchain is a
solution looking for a problem’’. Indeed, we have to still focus
on our traditional solutions to some issues and challenges, but
keep an eye on such emerging technologies. It means that a
balance should always be made in a case-by-case scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology is an emerging solution for decen-
tralized transactions and data management without the need
of a trusted third party. It is an open and distributed ledger,
enabling the recording of transactions among various parties
in a verifiable way. To date, blockchains have been studied
in several domains like healthcare and supply chain manage-
ment, but there has been little work investigating its potential
application in the field of intrusion detection. Motivated by
this observation, our work mainly discusses the applicability
of blockchain technology to mitigate the challenges of data
sharing and trust computation in a collaborative detection
environment. We identify that blockchains have a potential
impact on the improvement of an IDS, whereas not all IDS
issues can be solved with this technology.
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